We show an efficient secure two-party protocol, based on Yao's construction, which provides security against malicious adversaries. Yao's original protocol is only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and can be transformed into a protocol that achieves security against malicious adversaries by applying the compiler of Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson (the "GMW compiler"). However, this approach does not seem to be very practical as it requires using generic zero-knowledge proofs. Our construction is based on applying cut-and-choose techniques to the original circuit and inputs. Security is proved according to the ideal/real simulation paradigm, and the proof is in the standard model (with no random oracle model or common reference string assumptions). The resulting protocol is computationally efficient: the only usage of asymmetric cryptography is for running O(1) oblivious transfers for each input bit (or for each bit of a statistical security parameter, whichever is larger). Our protocol combines techniques from folklore (like cut-and-choose) along with new techniques for efficiently proving consistency of inputs. We remark that a naive implementation of the cut-and-choose technique with Yao's protocol does not yield a secure protocol. This is the first paper to show how to properly implement these techniques, and to provide a full proof of security. Our protocol can also be interpreted as a constant-round black-box reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer and perfectly hiding commitments, or a black-box reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer alone, with a number of rounds which is linear in a statistical security parameter. These two reductions are comparable to Kilian's (20th STOC, 1988) reduction, which uses OT alone but incurs a number of rounds which is linear in the depth of the circuit.
our case, the honesty of the parties' behavior) to an NP-complete problem, and using generic zero-knowledge proofs to prove this statement. The resulting secure protocol therefore runs in polynomial time but is rather inefficient. (For more details on existing methods for proving security against malicious behavior see the section on related work below.)
Malicious behavior and cut-and-choose. Consider for a moment what happens if party P 1 is malicious. In such a case, it can construct a garbled circuit that computes a function that is different to the one that P 1 and P 2 agreed to compute. A folklore solution to this problem uses the "cut-and-choose" technique. According to this technique, P 1 first constructs many garbled circuits and sends them to P 2 . Then, P 2 asks P 1 to "open" half of them (namely, reveal the decryption keys corresponding to these circuits). P 1 opens the requested half, and P 2 checks that they were constructed correctly. If they were, then P 2 evaluates the rest of the circuits and derives the output from them. The idea behind this methodology is that if a malicious P 1 constructs the circuits incorrectly, then P 2 will detect this with high probability. Clearly, this solution solves the problem of P 1 constructing the circuit incorrectly. However, it does not suffice. First, it creates new problems within itself. Most outstandingly, once the parties now evaluate a number of circuits, some mechanism must be employed to make sure that they use the same input when evaluating each circuit (otherwise, as we show below, an adversarial party could learn more information than allowed). Second, in order to present a proof of security based on simulation, there are additional requirements that are not dealt with by just employing cut-and-choose (e.g., input extraction). Third, the folklore description of cut-and-choose is very vague, and there are a number of details that are crucial when implementing it. For example, if P 2 evaluates many circuits, then the protocol must specify what P 2 should do if it does not receive the same output in every circuit. If the protocol requires P 2 to abort in this case (because it detected cheating from P 1 ), then this behavior actually yields a concrete attack in which P 1 can always learn a specified bit of P 2 's input. It can be shown that P 2 must take the majority output and proceed, even if it knows that P 1 has attempted to cheat. This is just one example of a subtlety that must be dealt with. Another example relates to the fact that P 1 may be able to construct a circuit that can be opened with two different sets of keys: the first set opens the circuit correctly and the second incorrectly. In such a case, an adversarial P 1 can pass the basic cut-and-choose test by opening the circuits to be checked correctly. However, it can also supply incorrect keys to the circuits to be computed and thus cause the output of the honest party to be incorrect.
Our contributions. This paper provides several contributions:
• Efficient protocol for malicious parties: We present an implementation of Yao's protocol with the cut-and-choose methodology, which is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and is computationally efficient: the protocol does not use public-key operations, except for performing oblivious transfers for every input bit of P 2 . For n-bit inputs and a statistical security parameter s, the protocol uses O(max(s, n)) oblivious transfers. Thus, when the input size is of the same order as the security parameter, only O(1) oblivious transfers are needed per input bit. Due to the use of cut-and-choose, we incur a multiplicative increase by a factor of s in the communication complexity of our protocol, which is O(s|C|) times the length of symmetric ciphertexts, and in addition s 2 n commitments. Beyond carefully implementing the cut-and-choose technique on the circuits in order to ensure that the garbled circuits are constructed correctly, we present a new method for enforcing the parties to use the same input in every circuit. This method involves "consistency checks" that are based on cut-and-choose tests which are applied to the sets of commitments to the garbled values associated with the input wires of the circuit, rather than to the circuits themselves.
In actuality, we combine the cut-and-choose test over the circuits together with the cut-and-choose test over the commitments in order to obtain a secure solution.
The test is rather complex conceptually, but is exceedingly simple to implement. Specifically, P 1 just needs to generate a number of commitments to the garbled values associated with the input wires, and then open them based on cut-and-choose queries from P 2 . (Actually, these cut-and-choose queries are chosen jointly by the parties using a simple coin-tossing protocol; this is necessary for achieving simulation.) We note that in this work we have emphasized providing a clear and full proof of the protocol, rather than fully optimizing its overhead at the expense of complicating the proof.
• Simulation based proof: We present a rigorous proof of the security of the protocol, based on the real/ideal-model simulation paradigm [5, 10] . The proof is in the standard model, with no random oracle model or common random string assumptions. The protocol was designed to support such a proof, rather than make do with separate proofs of privacy and correctness. (It is well-known that it is strictly harder to obtain a simulation-based proof rather than security under such definitions.) One important advantage of simulation-based proofs is that they enable the use of the protocol as a building block in more complicated protocols, while proving the security of the latter using general composition theorems like those of [5, 10] . (For example, the secure protocol of [1] for finding the kth ranked element is based on invoking several secure computations of simpler functions, and provides simulation-based security against malicious adversaries if the invoked computations have a simulation-based proof. However, prior to our work, there was no known way, except for the GMW compiler, of efficiently implementing these computations with this level of security, and as a result there was no efficient way of implementing the protocols of [1] with security against malicious adversaries.) See [5, 10] for more discussion on the importance of simulation-based definitions.
We stress that although a number of the techniques employed here have appeared previously in the literature, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to present a rigorous proof of security for the resulting protocol. A straightforward implementation of the folklore techniques does not yield a secure protocol, and great care needs to be taken in order to enable the proof to go through.
• A black-box reduction: Our protocol can be interpreted as a constant-round blackbox reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer and perfectly hiding commitments. The perfectly hiding commitments are only used for conducting constant-round joint coin-tossing of a string of length s, where s is a statistical security parameter. This coin-tossing can be carried out sequentially (bit by bit), without using perfectly hiding commitments. We therefore also obtain an O(s) round black-box reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer alone. These two reductions are comparable to Kilian's reduction, which uses OT alone but incurs a number of rounds which is linear in the depth of the circuit [19] . In addition, our reduction is much more efficient than that of [19] .
Related work. As we have mentioned, this paper presents a protocol which (1) has a proof of security against malicious adversaries in the standard model, according to the real/ideal model simulation definition, (2) has essentially the same computational overhead as Yao's original protocol (which is only secure against semi-honest adversaries), and (3) has a somewhat larger communication overhead, which depends on a statistical security parameter s.
We compare this result to other methods for securing Yao's protocol against malicious parties. There are several possible approaches to this task:
• The parties can reduce the statement about the honesty of their behavior to a statement which has a well-known zero-knowledge proof, and then prove this statement. This is the approach taken by the GMW compiler [12] . The resulting secure protocol is not black-box, and is rather inefficient.
• Another approach is to apply a cut-and-choose modification to Yao's protocol.
Mohassel and Franklin [25] show such a protocol which has about the same overhead as ours, namely a communication overhead of O(|C|s + n 2 s) for a circuit C with n inputs, and a statistical security parameter s. The protocol of [25] provides output to the circuit evaluator alone. It enables, however, the circuit constructor to carry out the following attack: it can corrupt its OT input which corresponds to a 0 value of the first input bit of the circuit evaluator, while not corrupting the OT input for the 1 value. Other than that it follows the protocol. This behavior forces the circuit evaluator to abort if its first input bit is 0, while if its first input bit is 1, it does not learn anything at all about the attack. If the evaluator complains, then the circuit constructor can conclude that its first input bit is 0, and therefore, the evaluator cannot complain if it wants to preserve its privacy. (This attack is similar to the attack we describe in Sect. 3.2 where we discuss the encoding of P 2 's input.) The protocol therefore does not provide security according to a standard definition. (We note however that this attack can be prevented using the methods we describe in Sect. 3.2 for encoding P 2 's input.) Another protocol which is based on cut-and-choose is described in [20] . This protocol uses committed OT to address attacks similar to the one described above. We stress that both of these papers [20, 25] lack a full proof of security, and to our best judgment they need considerable changes in order to support security according to a simulation-based definition.
• The construction of [25] was improved by Woodruff [30] , who described how to reduce the communication to O(s|C| + sn) = O(s|C|), using expanders. It seems that this approach can also be applied to our construction, but we have not incorporated it into this work.
• Jarecki and Shmatikov [16] designed a protocol in which the parties efficiently prove, gate by gate, that their behavior is correct. The protocol runs in a constant number of rounds, and is based on the use of a special homomorphic encryption system, which is used to encode the tables of each gate of the circuit (compared to the use of symmetric encryption in Yao's original protocol and in our paper). The protocol is secure in a universally composable way under the decisional composite residuosity and the strong RSA assumptions, assuming a common reference string. Compared to our protocol, this protocol has a greater computational overhead (O(|C|) rather than O(n) public key operations), but a smaller communication overhead (O(|C|) rather than O(s|C|+s 2 n). In addition, our protocol can be based on general assumptions.
In this paper, we construct an efficient protocol for general secure computation. Thus, we do not (and cannot) compete with protocols that are constructed for specific tasks, like voting, auctions, etcetera. We also do not discuss here the large body of work that considers the efficiency of secure multi-party computation.
Organization. We present standard definitions of security for secure two-party computation in Sect. 2.1. Then, in Sect. 2.2 we show that a functionality that provides outputs to both parties can be securely reduced to one which provides output for a single party, and therefore we can focus on the latter case. In Sect. 3 we describe our protocol and in Sect. 4 prove its security. In Sect. 5 we focus on the issue of efficiency and begin by analyzing the complexity of our protocol. Then, in Sect. 5.1 we discuss efficient implementations of the primitives that are used in our protocol. The basic protocol we describe increases the number of inputs, and therefore the number of OT invocations. In Sect. 5.2 we show how to reduce this number of OT invocations in order to improve efficiency. We remark that in Appendix we provide a description of Yao's basic protocol for two-party that is based on [22] .
Preliminaries

Definitions-Secure Computation
In this section we present the definition for secure two-party computation. The following description and definition is based on [10, Chap. 7] , which in turn follows [4, 5, 13, 24] . Two-party computation. A two-party protocol problem is cast by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as a functionality and denote it f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , where f = ( f 1 , f 2 ). That is, for every pair of inputs (x, y), the output-pair is a random variable ( f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)) ranging over pairs of strings. The first party (with input x) wishes to obtain f 1 (x, y), and the second party (with input y) wishes to obtain f 2 (x, y). 1 Adversarial behavior. Loosely speaking, the aim of a secure two-party protocol is to protect an honest party against dishonest behavior by the other party. In this paper, we consider malicious adversaries who may arbitrarily deviate from the specified protocol. When considering malicious adversaries, there are certain undesirable actions that cannot be prevented. Specifically, a party may refuse to participate in the protocol, may substitute its local input (and use instead a different input) and may abort the protocol prematurely. One ramification of the adversary's ability to abort is that it is impossible to achieve "fairness". That is, the adversary may obtain its output while the honest party does not. As is standard for two-party computation, in this work we consider a static corruption model, where one of the parties is adversarial and the other is honest, and this is fixed before the execution begins.
Security of protocols (informal).
The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in the protocol to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted third party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted third party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the above-described ideal computation.
Execution in the ideal model. As we have mentioned, some malicious behavior cannot be prevented (for example, early aborting). This behavior is therefore incorporated into the ideal model. An ideal execution proceeds as follows:
Inputs: Each party obtains an input, denoted w (w = x for P 1 , and w = y for P 2 ). Send inputs to trusted party: An honest party always sends w to the trusted party. A malicious party may, depending on w, either abort or send some w ∈ {0, 1} |w| to the trusted party. Trusted party answers first party: In case it has obtained an input pair (x, y), the trusted party first replies to the first party with f 1 (x, y). Otherwise (i.e., in case it receives only one valid input), the trusted party replies to both parties with a special symbol ⊥. Trusted party answers second party: In case the first party is malicious it may, depending on its input and the trusted party's answer, decide to stop the trusted party by sending it ⊥ after receiving its output. In this case the trusted party sends ⊥ to the second party. Otherwise (i.e., if not stopped), the trusted party sends f 2 (x, y) to the second party. Outputs: An honest party always outputs the message it has obtained from the trusted party. A malicious party may output an arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its initial input and the message obtained from the trusted party.
Let f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a functionality, where f = ( f 1 , f 2 ), and let M = (M 1 , M 2 ) be a pair of non-uniform probabilistic expected polynomial-time machines (representing parties in the ideal model). Such a pair is admissible if for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}, we have that M i is honest (i.e., follows the honest party instructions in the above-described ideal execution). Then, the joint execution of f under M in the ideal model (on input pair (x, y)), denoted ideal f,M (x, y), is defined as the output pair of M 1 and M 2 from the above ideal execution.
Execution in the real model. We next consider the real model in which a real (two-party) protocol is executed (and there exists no trusted third party). In this case, a malicious party may follow an arbitrary feasible strategy; that is, any strategy implementable by non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machines. In particular, the malicious party may abort the execution at any point in time (and when this happens prematurely, the other party is left with no output). Let f be as above and let be a two-party protocol for computing f . Furthermore, let M = (M 1 , M 2 ) be a pair of non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machines (representing parties in the real model). Such a pair is admissible if for at least one i ∈ {1, 2} we have that M i is honest (i.e., follows the strategy specified by ). Then, the joint execution of under M in the real model (on input pair (x, y)), denoted real ,M (x, y), is defined as the output pair of M 1 and M 2 resulting from the protocol interaction.
Security as emulation of a real execution in the ideal model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of protocols. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure two-party protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated by saying that admissible pairs in the ideal model are able to simulate admissible pairs in an execution of a secure real-model protocol. Namely, the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
We note that the above definition assumes that the parties know the input lengths (this can be seen from the requirement that |x| = |y|). Some restriction on the input lengths is unavoidable, see [10, Sect. 7 .1] for discussion. We also note that we allow the ideal adversary/simulator to run in expected (rather than strict) polynomial-time. This is essential for achieving constant-round protocols; see [3] .
We denote the security parameter by n and, for the sake of simplicity, unify it with the length of the inputs (thus we consider security for "all sufficiently long inputs"). Everything in the paper remains the same if a separate security parameter n is used, and we consider security for inputs of all lengths. We will also use a statistical security parameter s; see the beginning of Sect. 3.1 for an explanation of the use of this separate parameter.
The hybrid model. Our protocol uses a secure oblivious transfer protocol as a subprotocol. It has been shown in [5] that it suffices to analyze the security of such a protocol in a hybrid model in which the parties interact with each other and have access to a trusted party that computes the oblivious transfer protocol for them. This model is a hybrid of the real and ideal models: on the one hand, the parties send regular messages to each other, like in the real model; on the other hand, the parties have access to a trusted party, like in the ideal model. We remark that the composition theorem of [5] holds for the case that the subprotocol executions are all run sequentially (and the messages of the protocol calling the subprotocol do not overlap with any execution). We also remark that if the oblivious transfer subprotocol is secure under parallel composition, then it is straightforward to extend [5] so that the subprotocols may be run in parallel (again, as long as the messages of the protocol calling the subprotocol do not overlap with any execution).
Functionalities that Provide Output to a Single Party
In the definition above, we have considered the case that both parties receive output, and these outputs may be different. However, the presentation of our protocol is far simpler for the case that only party P 2 receives output. We will show now that this suffices for the general case. That is, any protocol that can securely compute any efficient functionality f (x, y) where only P 2 receives output, can be used to securely compute any efficient functionality f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) where party P 1 receives f 1 (x, y) and party P 2 receives f 2 (x, y).
Let f = ( f 1 , f 2 ) be a functionality. We wish to construct a secure protocol in which P 1 receives f 1 (x, y) and P 2 receives f 2 (x, y); as a building block we use a protocol for computing any efficient functionality with the limitation that only P 2 receives output. Let F be a field that contains the range of values { f 1 (x, y)} x,y∈{0,1} n , and let p, a, b be randomly chosen elements in F. Then, in addition to x, party P 1 's input includes the elements p, a, b. Furthermore, define a functionality g (that has only a single output) as follows:
where α = p + f 1 (x, y), β = a · α + b, and the arithmetic operations are defined in F. Note that α is a one-time pad encryption of P 1 's output f 1 (x, y), and β is an informationtheoretic message authentication tag of α (specifically, aα + b is a pairwise-independent hash of α). Now, the parties compute the functionality g, using a secure protocol in which only P 2 receives output. Following this, P 2 sends the pair (α, β) to P 1 . Party P 1 checks that β = a · α + b; if yes, it outputs α − p, and otherwise it outputs ⊥.
It is easy to see that P 2 learns nothing about P 1 's output f 1 (x, y), and that it cannot alter the output that P 1 will receive (beyond causing it to abort), except with probability 1/|F|. (We assume that 1/|F is the required probability for detecting attempts to alter the output. If it is required instead that any change by P 2 to P 1 's output is detected with probability 2 −s , then the parameters a, b and the computation of β = a · α + b can be defined in a field whose representation is s bits long.) We remark that it is also straightforward to construct a simulator for the above protocol. 2 We remark that the circuit for computing g is only mildly larger than that for computing f . Thus, the construction above is also efficient and has only a mild effect on the complexity of the secure protocol (assuming that the complexity of the original protocol, where only P 2 receives output, is proportional to the size of the circuit computing f ).
The Protocol
Our protocol is based upon Yao's garbled circuit construction, which is secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries [31] . That protocol has two parties: P 1 (who is the sender, or circuit constructor), and P 2 (who is the receiver, or the circuit evaluator). The protocol is described in Appendix, and a full description and proof of this protocol is available in [22] . Our presentation from here on assumes full familiarity with Yao's basic protocol.
There are a number of issues that must be dealt with when attempting to make Yao's protocol secure against malicious adversaries rather than just semi-honest ones (beyond the trivial observation that the oblivious transfer subprotocol must now be secure in the presence of malicious adversaries).
First and foremost, a malicious P 1 must be forced to construct the garbled circuit correctly so that it indeed computes the desired function. The method that is typically referred to for this task is called cut-and-choose. According to this methodology, P 1 constructs many independent copies of the garbled circuit and sends them to P 2 . Party P 2 then asks P 1 to open half of them (chosen randomly). After P 1 does so, and party P 2 checks that the opened circuits are correct, P 2 is convinced that most of the remaining (unopened) garbled circuits are also constructed correctly. (If there are many incorrectly constructed circuits, then with high probability, one of those circuits will be in the set that P 2 asks to open.) The parties can then evaluate the remaining unopened garbled circuits as in the original protocol for semi-honest adversaries, and take the majority output-value. 3 2 Note that in order to meet Definition 1, one must actually switch the roles of P 1 and P 2 above. This is due to the fact that by our definition of the ideal model, a corrupted P 1 is given the capability to cause P 2 to abort, even after P 1 has received its own output. In contrast, a corrupted P 2 is not given this capability. In the protocol described, P 2 receives output first and can cause P 1 to abort, rather than the reverse. This is "fixed" by just switching the roles. 3 The reason for taking the majority value as the output is that the aforementioned test only reveals a single incorrectly constructed circuit with probability 1/2. Therefore, if P 1 generates a single or constant number of "bad" circuits, there is a reasonable chance that it will not be caught. In contrast, there is only an exponentially small probability that the test reveals no corrupt circuit and at the same time a majority of the circuits that are not checked are incorrect. Consequently, with overwhelming probability it holds that if the test succeeds and P 2 takes the majority result of the remaining circuits, then the result is correct. We remark
The cut-and-choose technique described above indeed solves the problem of a malicious P 1 constructing incorrect circuits. However, it also generates new problems! The primary problem that arises is that since there are now many circuits being evaluated, we must make sure that both P 1 and P 2 use the same inputs in each circuit; we call these consistency checks. Consistency checks are important since if the parties were able to provide different inputs to different copies of the circuit, then they can learn information that is different from the desired output of the function. It is obvious that P 2 can do so, since it observes the outputs of all circuits, but in fact even P 1 , who only gets to see the majority output, can learn additional information: information: Suppose, for example, that the protocol computes n invocations of a circuit computing the inner-product between n bit inputs. A malicious P 2 could provide the inputs 10 · · · 0 , 010 · · · 0 , . . . , 0 · · · 01 , and learn all of P 1 's input. If, on the other hand, P 1 is malicious, then it could also provide the inputs 10 · · · 0 , 010 · · · 0 , . . . , 0 · · · 01 . In this case, P 2 sends it the value which is output by the majority of the circuits, and which is equal to the majority value of P 2 's input bits.
Another problem that arises when proving security is that the simulator must be able to fool P 2 and give it incorrect circuits (even though P 2 runs a cut-and-choose test). This is solved using rather standard techniques, like choosing the circuits to be opened via a coin-tossing protocol (to our knowledge, this issue has gone unnoticed in all previous applications of cut-and-choose to Yao's protocol). Yet another problem is that P 1 might provide corrupt inputs to some of P 2 's possible choices in the OT protocols. P 1 might then learn P 2 's input based on whether or not P 2 aborts the protocol.
We begin by presenting a high-level overview of the protocol. We then proceed to describe the consistency checks, and finally the full protocol.
High-Level Overview
We work with two security parameters. The parameter n is the security parameter for the commitment schemes, encryption, and the oblivious transfer protocol. The parameter s is a statistical security parameter which specifies how many garbled circuits are used. The difference between these parameters is due to the fact that the value of n depends on computational assumptions, whereas the value of s reflects the possible error probability that is incurred by the cut-and-choose technique and as such is a "statistical" security parameter. Although it is possible to use a single parameter n, it may be possible to take s to be much smaller than n. Recall that for simplicity, and in order to reduce the number of parameters, we denote the length of the input by n as well.
Protocol 1 (High-level overview)
. Parties P 1 and P 2 have respective inputs x and y, and wish to compute the output f (x, y) for P 2 .
Footnote 3 continued that the alternative of aborting in case not all the outputs are the same (namely, where cheating is detected) is not secure and actually yields a concrete attack. The attack works as follows. Assume that P 1 is corrupted and that it constructs all of the circuits correctly except for one. The "incorrect circuit" is constructed so that it computes the exclusive-or of the desired function f with the first bit of P 2 's input. Now, if P 2 policy is to abort as soon as two outputs are not the same then P 1 knows that P 2 aborts if, and only if, the first bit of its input is 1. 
Checks for Correctness and Consistency
As can be seen from the above overview, P 1 and P 2 run a number of checks, with the aim of forcing a potentially malicious P 1 to construct the circuits correctly and use the same inputs in (most of) the evaluated circuits. This section describes these checks. Unfortunately, we are unable to present the protocol, nor prove its security, in a modular fashion. Rather, the correctness and consistency checks are closely intertwined with the other parts of the protocol. We will therefore describe the correctness and consistency checks here, and describe the full protocol is Sect. 3.3. We hope that this improves the readability of the actual protocol.
Encoding P 2 's input: As mentioned above, a malicious P 1 may provide corrupt input to one of P 2 's possible inputs in an OT protocol. If P 2 chooses to learn this input then it will not be able to decode the garbled tables which use this value, and it will therefore have to abort. If P 2 chooses to learn the other input associated with this wire then it will not notice that the first input is corrupt. P 1 can therefore learn P 2 's input based on whether or not P 2 aborts. (Note that checking that the circuit is well-formed will not help in thwarting this attack, since the attack is based on changing P 1 's input to the OT protocol.) The attack is prevented by the parties replacing each input bit of P 2 with s new input bits whose exclusive-or is used instead of the original input (this step was described as
Step 0 of Protocol 1, and is analyzed in Lemma 5). P 2 therefore has 2 s−1 ways to encode a 0 input, and 2 s−1 ways to encode a 1, and given its input it chooses an encoding with uniform probability. The parties then execute the protocol with the new circuit, and P 2 uses oblivious transfer to learn the garbled values of its new inputs. As we will show, if P 1 supplies incorrect values as garbled values that are associated with P 2 's input, the probability of P 2 detecting this cheating is almost independent (up to a bias of 2 −s+1 ) of P 2 's actual input. This is not true if P 2 's inputs are not "split" in the way described above. The encoding presented here increases the number of P 2 's input bits and, respectively, the number of OTs, from n to ns. In Sect. 5.2 we show how to reduce the number of new inputs for P 2 
(and thus OTs) to a total of only O(max(s, n)).
An unsatisfactory method for proving consistency of P 1 's input: Consider the following idea for forcing P 1 to provide the same input to all circuits. Let s be a security parameter and assume that there are s garbled copies of the circuit. Then, P 1 generates two ordered sets of commitments for every wire of the circuit. Each set contains s commitments: the "0 set" contains commitments to the garbled encodings of 0 for this wire in every circuit, and the "1 set" contains commitments to the garbled encodings of 1 for this wire in every circuit. P 2 receives these commitments from P 1 and then chooses a random subset of the circuits, which will be defined as check-circuits. These circuits will never be evaluated and are used only for checking correctness and consistency. Specifically, P 2 asks P 1 to de-garble all of the check-circuits and to open the values that correspond to the check-circuits in both commitment sets. (That is, if circuit i is a check-circuit, then P 1 decommits to both the 0 encoding and 1 encoding of all the input wires in circuit i.) Upon receiving the decommitments, P 2 verifies that all opened commitments from the "0 set" correspond to garbled values of 0, and that a similar property holds for commitments from the "1 set". It now remains for P 2 to evaluate the remaining circuits. In order to do this, P 1 provides (for each of its input wires) the garbled values that are associated with the wire in all of the remaining circuits. Then, P 1 must prove that all of these values come from the same set, without revealing whether the set that they come from is the "0 set" or the "1 set" (otherwise, P 2 will know P 1 's input). In this way, on the one hand, P 2 does not learn the input of P 1 , and on the other hand, it is guaranteed that all of the values come from the same set, and so P 1 is forced into using the same input in all circuits. This proof can be carried out using, for example, the proofs of partial knowledge of [6] . However, this would require n proofs, each for s values, thereby incurring O(ns) costly asymmetric operations which we want to avoid.
Proving consistency of P 1 's input: P 1 can prove consistency of its inputs without using public-key operations. The proof is based on a cut-and-choose test for the consistency of the commitment sets, which is combined with the cut-and-choose test for the correctness of the circuits. (Note that in the previous proposal, there is only one cut-and-choose test, and it is for the correctness of the circuits.) We start by providing a high-level description of the proof of consistency: The proof is based on P 1 constructing, for each of its input wires, s pairs of sets of commitments. One set in every pair contains commitments to the 0 values of this wire in all circuits, and the other set is the same with respect to 1. The protocol chooses a random subset of these pairs, and a random subset of the circuits, and checks that these sets provide consistent inputs for these circuits. Then the protocol evaluates the remaining circuits, and asks P 1 to open, in each of the remaining pairs, and only in one set in every pair, its garbled values for all evaluated circuits. (In this way, P 2 does not learn whether these garbled values correspond to a 0 or to a 1.) In order for the committed sets and circuits to pass P 2 's checks, there must be large subsets C and S, of the circuits and commitment sets, respectively, such that every choice of a circuit from C and a commitment set from S results in a circuit and garbled values which compute the desired function f . P 2 accepts the verification stage only if all the circuits and sets it chooses to check are from C and S, respectively. This means that if P 2 does not abort then circuits which are not from C are likely to be a minority of the evaluated circuits, and a similar argument holds for S. Therefore the majority result of the evaluation stage is correct. The exact construction is as follows:
Stage 1-Commitments: P 1 generates s garbled versions of the circuit. Furthermore, it generates commitments to the garbled values of the wires corresponding to P 2 's input in each circuit. These commitments are generated in ordered pairs so that the first item in a pair corresponds to the 0 value and the second to the 1 value. The procedure regarding the input bits of P 1 is more complicated (see Fig. 2 for a diagram explaining this construction). P 1 generates s pairs of sets of committed values for each of its input wires. Specifically, for every input wire i of P 1 , it generates s sets of the form {W i, j , W i, j } s j=1 ; we call these commitment sets. Before describing the content of these sets, denote by k b i,r the garbled value that is assigned to the value b ∈ {0, 1} in wire i of circuit r . Then, the sets W i, j and W i, j both contain s + 1 commitments and are defined as follows. Let b ∈ R {0, 1} be a random bit, chosen independently for every {W i, j , W i, j } pair. Define W i, j to contain a commitment to b, as well as commitments to the garbled value corresponding to b in wire i in all of the s circuits, and define W i, j similarly, but with respect to 1−b. In other words,
The fact that b is chosen randomly means that with probability 1/2 the set W i, j contains the commitments to values corresponding to 0, and with probability 1/2 it contains the commitments to values corresponding to 1. We stress that in each of the pairs
, the values that are committed to are the same. The only difference is that independent randomness is used in each pair for choosing b and constructing the commitments. We denote the first bit committed to in a commitment set as the indicator bit.
After constructing these circuits and commitment sets, party P 1 sends to P 2 all of the s garbled circuits (i.e., the garbled gate-tables and output-tables, but not the garbled values corresponding to the input wires), and all the commitment sets. Note that if P 1 's input is of length n, then there are sn pairs of commitment sets; and a total of sn(2s
Stage 2-Challenge: Two random strings ρ, ρ ∈ R {0, 1} s are chosen and sent to P 1 (in the actual protocol, these strings are determined via a simple coin-tossing protocol). The string ρ is a challenge indicating which garbled circuits to open, and the string ρ is a challenge indicating which commitment sets to open. We call the opened circuits checkcircuits and the unopened ones evaluation-circuits. Likewise, we call the opened sets check-sets and the unopened ones evaluation-sets. A circuit (resp., commitment set) is defined to be a check-circuit (resp., check-set) if the corresponding bit in ρ (resp., ρ ) equals 1; otherwise, it is defined to be an evaluation-circuit (resp., evaluation-set).
Stage 3-Opening: First, party P 1 opens all the commitments corresponding to P 2 's input wires in all of the check-circuits. Second, in all of the check-sets P 1 opens the commitments that correspond to check-circuits. That is, if circuit r is a check circuit, then P 1 decommits to all of the values com(k 0 i,r ), com(k 1 i,r ) in check-sets, where i is any of P 1 's input bits. Finally, for every check-set, P 1 opens the commitment to the indicator bit, the initial value in each of the sets W i, j , W i, j . See Fig. 3 for a diagram in which the values which are opened are highlighted (the diagram refers to only one of P 1 's input wires in the circuit).
Stage 4-Verification: In this step, party P 2 verifies that all of the check-circuits were correctly constructed. In addition, it verifies that, with regards to P 1 's inputs, all the opened commitments in sets whose first item is a commitment to 0 are to garbled encodings of 0; likewise for 1. These checks are carried out as follows. First, in all of the check-circuits, P 2 receives the decommitments to the garbled values corresponding to its own input, and by the order of the commitments P 2 knows which value corresponds to 0 and which value corresponds to 1. Second, for every check-circuit, P 2 receives decommitments to the garbled input values of P 1 in all the check-sets, along with a bit indicating whether these garbled values correspond to 0 or to 1. It first checks that for every wire, the garbled values of 0 (resp., of 1) are all equal. Then, the above decommitments enable the complete opening of the garbled circuits (i.e., the decryption of all of the garbled tables). Once this has been carried out, it is possible to simply check that the check-circuits are all correctly constructed. Namely, that they agree with a specific and agreed-upon circuit computing f .
Stage 5-Evaluation and Verification: Party P 1 reveals the garbled values corresponding to its input: If i is a wire that corresponds to a bit of P 1 's input and r is an evaluation-circuit, then P 1 decommits to the commitments k b i,r in all of the evaluationsets, where b is the value of its input bit. This is depicted in Fig. 4 . Finally, P 2 verifies that (1) for every input wire, all the opened commitments that were opened in evaluationsets contain the same garbled value, and (2) for every i, j P 1 opened commitments of evaluated circuits in exactly one of W i, j or W i, j . If these checks pass, it continues to evaluate the circuit.
Intuition. Having described the mechanism for checking consistency, we now provide some intuition as to why it is correct. A simple cut-and-choose check verifies that most of the evaluated circuits are correctly constructed. The main remaining issue is ensuring that P 1 's inputs to most circuits are consistent. If P 1 wants to provide different inputs to Fig. 4 . P 1 opens in the evaluation-sets, the commitments that correspond to its input. In every evaluation-set these commitments come from the same item in the pair. a certain wire in two circuits, then all the W i, j (or W i, j ) sets it opens in evaluation-sets must contain a commitment to 0 in the first circuit and a commitment to 1 in the other circuit. However, if any of these sets is chosen to be checked, and the circuits are among the checked circuits, then P 2 aborts. This means that if P 1 attempts to provide different inputs to two circuits and they are checked, it is almost surely caught. Now, since P 2 outputs the majority output of the evaluated circuits, the result is affected by P 1 providing different inputs only if these inputs affect a constant fraction of the circuits. But since all of these circuits must not be checked, P 1 's probability of success is exponentially small in s.
The Full Protocol
We now describe the full protocol in detail. We use the notation com b to refer to a perfectly binding commitment scheme, and com h to refer to a perfectly hiding commitment scheme (See [9] for definitions).
Protocol 2. (protocol for computing f (x, y)):
• Input: P 1 has input x ∈ {0, 1} n and P 2 has input y ∈ {0, 1} n .
• Auxiliary input: a statistical security parameter s and the description of a circuit 
and
For each i, j, the sets are constructed using independent randomness, and in particular the value of b is chosen independently for every j = Fig. 3 ). In addition, P 1 decommits to the indicator bits of these sets (i.e., to the first committed value in each set).
For every pair of check-sets (W i, j , W i, j ), party P 1 decommits to the first value in each set (i.e., to the value that is supposed to be a commitment to the indicator bit, com(0) or com (1) Fig. 4 ). 4 Recall that ρ and ρ are used to ensure that P 1 constructs the circuits correctly and uses consistent input in each circuit. Thus, it may seem strange that they are generated via a coin-tossing protocol, and not just chosen singlehandedly by P 2 . Indeed, in order to prove the security of the protocol when P 1 is corrupted, there is no need for a coin-tossing protocol here. However, having P 2 choose ρ and ρ singlehandedly creates a problem for the simulation in the case that P 2 is corrupted. We therefore use a coin-tossing protocol instead. 
Proof of Security
The security of Protocol 2 is stated in the following theorem. [22] . Then, Protocol 2 securely computes f .
The theorem is proved in two stages: first for the case that P 1 is corrupted, and next for the case that P 2 is corrupted.
Security Against a Malicious P 1
Intuition. The proof constructs an ideal-model adversary/simulator which has access to P 1 and to the trusted party, and can simulate the view of an actual run of the protocol. It uses the fact that the strings ρ, ρ , which choose the circuits and commitment sets that are checked, are uniformly distributed even if P 1 is malicious. The simulator runs the protocol until P 1 opens the commitments of the checked circuits and checked commitment sets, and then rewinds the execution and runs it again with new random ρ, ρ values. We expect that about one quarter of the circuits will be checked in the first execution and evaluated in the second execution. For these circuits, in the first execution the simulator learns the translation between the garbled values of P 1 's input wires and the actual values of these wires, and in the second execution it learns the garbled values that are associated with P 1 's input (this association is learned from the garbled values that P 1 sends to P 2 ). Combining the two, it learns P 1 's input x, which can then be sent to the trusted party. The trusted party answers with f (x, y), which we use to define P 2 's output and complete the simulation.
When examining the detailed proof, first note that the strings ρ, ρ computed in Step 4 of Protocol 2, are uniformly distributed even in the presence of a malicious P 1 . This is due to the perfect hiding of P 2 's commitments in the coin-tossing subprotocol. We say that a circuit GC i and a superset S j agree if the checks in Step 7 of the protocol succeed when considering only the check-circuit GC i and the superset of check sets S j . In particular, this means that GC i computes the required function when the garbled values of P 1 's input wires are taken from S j , and that these garbled values agree with the indicator bit of the sets in S j . This also means that the committed values of the garbled values of P 2 's input wires in GC i are correctly constructed. (Some circuits might not agree with any set S j , e.g., if they do not compute f . Other circuits might agree with some supersets and not agree with others.)
We begin by proving two lemmas that will be used in analyzing the simulation (described below). We say that a circuit is ε-bad if more than εs of the supersets disagree with it. The following lemma shows that P 2 aborts (with high probability) if more than εs of the circuits are ε-bad . We can therefore concentrate on the case that εs or less of the circuits are bad.
Lemma 4.
If at least εs of the circuits are ε-bad , then P 2 aborts with probability of at least 1 − 2 · 2 −εs .
Proof. As a warmup, suppose that there is a single ε-bad circuit. Then the probability of P 2 not aborting is at most 1/2 + 1/2 · 2 −εs ; i.e., the probability that the bad circuit is not chosen as a check-circuit plus the probability that it is a check circuit but all checksets agree with it (since the circuits are chosen independently, we can just multiply the probabilities in the latter case). Suppose now that there are j different ε-bad circuits. Then the probability of P 2 not aborting is at most 2 − j + (1 − 2 − j )2 −εs ≤ 2 − j + 2 −εs . Setting j = εs yields the lemma.
The following lemma shows that P 2 aborting does not reveal information to P 1 about P 2 's input.
Lemma 5. For any two different inputs y and y of P 2 for the function f , the difference between the probability that P 2 aborts Protocol 2 when its input is y and when its input is y is at most n2 −s+1 .
Proof. P 2 may abort Protocol 2 in
Step 7(a) while checking the correctness of the check circuits and the check sets. In this case, the decision to abort is based on P 1 's construction of the sets and circuits, and on the random inputs of the parties, and is independent of P 2 's input. The same is true of Step 7(c) where P 2 checks P 1 's input to the evaluation circuits. In Step 7(b), however, P 2 aborts based on whether the values it learned in the oblivious transfer invocations open P 1 's commitments to the garbled values of P 2 's input. This case must be examined in detail.
Consider a specific input bit of P 2 . In Step 0 of Protocol 2 the circuit is changed so that this bit is computed as the exclusive-or of s new input bits of P 2 . Consider the s new inputs which replace a single input wire of the original circuit. Suppose that P 1 provides in the OT protocol corrupt values to both garbled values of one of P 2 's (new) input wires. Then P 2 aborts with probability 1 regardless of its input. If P 1 provides a corrupt OT value to exactly one of the two possible OT choices, of 1 ≤ j < s new wires, then P 2 aborts with probability 1 − 2 − j , again regardless of the actual value of its original input. This holds because the values assigned by P 2 to any proper subset of the s bits are independent of P 2 's actual input. Assume now that P 1 corrupts one OT value for each of the s new wires (say all '1' values). Then P 2 aborts with probability 1 if its original input had one value ('1' in this example), and aborts with probability 1 − 2 −s+1 if its original input had the other value (in this example, P 2 does not abort if its input is '0' and it chose only '0' inputs in the s OT invocations). Therefore, for any two different inputs y and y of P 2 of length n-bits each, the probability that P 2 aborts the protocol differs by at most n2 −s+1 , as required.
We are now ready to prove the security of the protocol under simulation-based definitions.
Lemma 6. Assume that the oblivious transfer protocol is secure, that the commitment scheme com h is perfectly hiding, and that the commitment scheme com b is perfectly binding. Then, Protocol 2 is secure in the case that P 1 is corrupted. (We say that a protocol is secure in the case that P 1 is corrupted if Definition 1 holds when
Proof. Let A 1 be an adversary corrupting P 1 ; we construct an ideal-model adversary/simulator B 1 . Since we assume that the oblivious transfer protocol is secure, we analyze the security of Protocol 2 in the hybrid model with a trusted party computing the oblivious transfer functionality.
The simulator. The simulator B 1 chooses a random input y for P 2 and uses it in all but the last stage of the simulation. B 1 receives all of the garbled circuits and commitments from A 1 . Simulator B 1 then runs the coin-tossing phase (for preparing the challenge strings) as P 2 would, and receives all of the required decommitments from A 1 , including the garbled values that supposedly correspond to its input. B 1 runs all of the checks that P 2 would run. If any of the checks fail, B 1 sends an abort message to A 1 , sends ⊥ to the trusted party and halts, outputting whatever A 1 outputs. Otherwise, B 1 rewinds A 1 and returns to the coin-tossing phase. Once again B 1 runs this phase as P 2 would (but with new randomness) and runs all of the checks that P 2 would run. B 1 continues this until all of the checks pass for a second time. Let α be the output of A 1 in this second successful execution (note that an honest P 1 has no output).
Denote by ρ, ρ the (uniformly distributed) challenge strings from the first execution of B 1 with A 1 , and denote byρ,ρ the challenge strings from the second execution. Furthermore, denote ρ = ρ 1 · · · ρ s andρ =ρ 1 · · ·ρ s . Now, if there are less than s/8 indices i for which ρ i = 1 andρ i = 0, then B 1 outputs fail 1 . Otherwise, let I be a subset of indices of size exactly s/8 for which ρ i = 1 andρ i = 0 (it is easier to work with a fixed number of i's that have this property, so we choose them here). Then, for every i ∈ I , we have that in the first execution GC i is a check circuit and in the second execution it is an evaluation circuit. Thus, B 1 obtains all of the decommitments of GC i in the first execution (including the association of the garbled values corresponding to P 1 's input-i.e., the decommitment to com(b) in the commitment-sets), and in the second execution it obtains the garbled values corresponding to P 1 's input that P 1 sends to P 2 . For each such i, it is possible to define P 1 's input in circuit GC i by associating the indicator bit obtained when GC i was a check circuit with the garbled value sent by P 1 when GC i was an evaluation circuit. Thus, B 1 obtains s/8 possible n-bit input vectors for P 1 . If no input value appears more than s/16 times, then B 1 outputs fail 2 . Otherwise, B 1 sets x to be the value that appears more than s/16 times and sends it to the trusted party. B 1 then outputs α (the output of A 1 in the second execution) and halts.
Analysis. We claim that the view of A 1 in the simulation with B 1 is statistically close to its view in a hybrid execution of Protocol 2 with a trusted party computing the oblivious transfer protocol. We first claim that the difference between the probability that P 2 receives "abort" (i.e., ⊥) in an ideal execution with B 1 and the probability that P 2 outputs "abort" (i.e. ⊥) in a real execution with A 1 is at most negligible. Observe that in the simulation, B 1 uses a random input for its emulation of P 2 instead of the real y that P 2 holds. This makes a difference when B 1 checks the decommitments for the wires that are associated with P 2 's input. (Notice that in the real protocol P 2 also uses its input in oblivious transfer subprotocols. Nevertheless, in the hybrid model that we are analyzing here, A 1 learns nothing about P 2 's input in the oblivious transfer because it is ideal.) Nevertheless, by Lemma 5 we know that the probability of abort is at most negligibly different between the case that P 2 has a random input and the case that it has a specific input y. From here on, we therefore consider the case that P 2 does not abort the protocol (i.e., does not output ⊥). We now prove that B 1 outputs fail 1 or fail 2 with at most negligible probability. The proof that fail 1 occurs with negligible probability follows from the Chernoff bound, as follows. Denote 
Bounding fail 2 . We now show that the event fail 2 occurs with negligible probability. Let ε = 1/16 and denote by B the event that at least εs of the circuits are ε-bad (i.e., the event that s/16 of the circuits are 1/16-bad). Denote by A the event that B 1 sends ⊥ to the trusted party. Lemma 4 shows that Pr[Ā|B] ≤ 2 · 2 −s/16 . We begin by analyzing the probability that fail 2 occurs givenB; i.e., given the event that less than s/16 of the circuits are 1/16-bad. Consider the set of s/8 circuits GC i with i ∈ I . The definition ofB implies that a majority of the s/8 circuits in I are not 1/16-bad. The circuits which are not 1/16-bad agree with at least 15s/16 of the commitment sets. The probability that any of these circuits does not agree with a majority of the evaluation sets is negligible: this event only happens if the number of evaluation sets is less than s/8, and the probability of this event happening can be bounded (using the Chernoff In the evaluation step, for each of its input wires P 1 opens the values for all evaluation circuits, taken from the same commitment set. P 2 and B 1 check that the values opened for a wire in all sets are equal. For the good circuits in I these values agree with the same logical value (the indicator bit of the set). Therefore in this case a majority of the circuits in I obtain the same logical input, and fail 2 does not occur. Completing the proof. We now show that conditioned on B 1 not outputting any fail message, the view of A 1 in the simulation is statistically close to its view in an execution of Protocol 2. First note that the probability of abort in the real and ideal executions is at most negligibly far apart (this follows from Lemma 5 and the fact that B 1 uses a random input instead of the one that the honest P 2 has). Next, consider the case that abort does not occur. Recall that B 1 just runs the honest P 2 's instructions. The only difference is that in the event that all of B 1 's checks pass in the first execution (which is the event of no abort that we are considering here), it rewinds the second execution until this event occurs again. The final view of A 1 is then the view that appears in this second execution in which this occurs. Since B 1 uses independent random coins each time, and follows P 2 's instructions each time, the above process results in a distribution that is identical to the view of A 1 in a real execution with P 2 .
We now proceed to show that the joint distribution of B 1 's output (which is just A 1 's output α) and the honest B 2 's output is computationally indistinguishable from the joint distribution of A 1 and P 2 's output in an execution of Protocol 2 (where an ideal oblivious transfer is used instead of the OT subprotocol). We will actually show statistical closeness. (This does not mean, however, that the overall protocol gives statistical security because our analysis is in the hybrid model for an oblivious transfer functionality and it depends on the security of the actual oblivious transfer subprotocol used.) In order to prove this, we show that if the real P 2 would have received the set of evaluation-circuits and decommitments that A 1 sent in the second execution with B 1 , and it has input y, then it would compute f (x, y) in a majority of the circuits (where x is the input value that B 1 sent to the trusted party computing f ). This follows from the same argument that was used to show above that fail 2 occurs with negligible probability: with all but negligible probability, most of the evaluation circuits are not ε-bad and they each agree with a majority of the evaluation sets. Denote these circuits as good (or ε-good) circuits. In particular, the committed values provided in these sets for P 1 's inputs in these circuits correctly decrypt the circuit according to their association with the indicator bit. P 2 also checks that each of P 1 's input wires receives the same garbled value in all sets. Therefore, the evaluation step is aborted unless P 1 opens garbled values for the good circuits that agree with the same logical value (the indicator bit of the set). The fact that these circuits are good also implies that P 2 obtains garbled values in the OT stage that agree with its input. As a result, a majority of the evaluation circuits obtain the same logical input (x, y) and compute f (x, y).
It remains to show that B 1 runs in expected polynomial-time. In order to see this, notice that aside from the rewinding, all of B 1 's work takes a strict polynomial number of steps. Furthermore, each rewinding attempt also takes a strict polynomial number of steps. Now, denote by p the probability that A 1 responds correctly and so B 1 's checks all pass. Then, the probability that B 1 enters the rewinding phase equals p. Furthermore, the expected number of rewinding attempts equals exactly 1/ p (notice that B 1 runs exactly the same strategy in each rewinding attempt). Thus, the overall expected running-time of B 1 equals poly(n, s) + p · 1/ p · poly(n, s) = poly(n, s). This completes the proof of Lemma 6 and thus the case that P 1 is corrupted.
(We note one important subtlety in this part of the proof: the sequential composition theorem of [5] was only proven for the case that the security of the subprotocol is proven via a simulator that runs in strict polynomial-time (see [18] for a full discussion of this issue). Thus, [5] does not cover the case that the simulator for the oblivious transfer subprotocol runs in expected polynomial-time. Despite this, we claim that this is no problem in our specific case. In order to see that B 1 runs in expected polynomial-time even if the oblivious transfer protocol is proven secure using expected polynomial-time simulation, note that we can divide A 1 into two parts. The first part runs up until the end of the oblivious transfer protocol and outputs state information; the second part takes the state information and continues until the end of the execution. Now, the simulator for the oblivious transfer protocol may result in an expected polynomial-time adversary for the first part of A 1 . However, the second part of A 1 still runs in strict polynomialtime, and B 1 only rewinds this second part. Therefore, the overall running-time of B 1 -even after replacing the ideal oblivious transfer functionality with a real protocol that may use expected polynomial-time simulation-is expected polynomial-time, as required.)
Security Against a Malicious P 2
Intuition. Intuitively, the security in this case is derived from the fact that: (a) the oblivious transfer protocol is secure, and so P 2 only learns a single set of keys (corresponding to a single input y) for decrypting the garbled circuits, and (b) the commitment schemes are hiding and so P 2 does not know what input corresponds to the garbled values that P 1 sends it for evaluating the circuit. Of course, in order to formally prove security we construct an ideal-model simulator B 2 working with an adversary A 2 that has corrupted P 2 . The simulator first extracts A 2 's input bits from the oblivious transfer protocol, and then sends the input y it obtained to the trusted party and receives back z = f (x, y). Given the output, the simulator constructs the garbled circuits. However, rather than constructing them all correctly, for each circuit it tosses a coin and, based on the result, either constructs the circuit correctly, or constructs it to compute the constant function outputting z (the output is received from the trusted party). In order to make sure that the simulator is not caught cheating, it biases the coin-tossing phase so that all of the correctly constructed garbled circuits are check-circuits, and all of the other circuits are evaluation-circuits (this is why the protocol uses joint coin-tossing rather than let P 2 alone choose the circuits to be opened). A 2 then checks the correctly constructed circuits, and is satisfied with the result as if it were interacting with a legitimate P 1 . A 2 therefore continues the execution with the circuits which always output z. The proof is based on the following lemma: Lemma 7. Assume that the oblivious transfer protocol is secure, that com h is a perfectly hiding commitment scheme, and that com and com b are perfectly binding commitment schemes. Then, Protocol 2 is secure in the case that P 2 is corrupted. Proof. As have described above, the simulator works by constructing some of the circuits correctly and some of them incorrectly. Before proceeding with the formal proof of the lemma, we show that it is possible to construct such "false circuits", so that A 2 cannot distinguish between them and correctly constructed circuits. Proof sketch. The proof of this lemma is taken from [22] (it is not stated in this way there, but is proven). We sketch the construction of GC here for the sake of completeness, and refer the reader to [22] for a full description and proof. The first step in the construction of the fake circuit GC is to choose two random keys k i and k i for every wire w i in the circuit C. Next, the gate tables of C are computed: let g be a gate with input wires w i , w j and output wire w . The table of gate g contains encryptions of the single key k that is associated with wire w , under all four combinations of the keys k i , k i , k j , k j that are associated with the input wires w i and w j to g. (This is in contrast to a real construction of the garbled circuit that involves encrypting both k and k , depending on the function that the gate in question computes.) That is, the following values are computed:
The gate table for g is then just a random ordering of the above four values. This sprocess is carried out for all of the gates of the circuit. It remains to describe how the output decryption tables are constructed. Denote the n-bit output z by z 1 , . . . , z n , and denote the circuit-output wires by w m−n+1 , . . . , w m . In addition, for every i = 1, . . . , n, let k m−n+i be the (single) key encrypted in the gate whose output wire is w m−n+i , and let k m−n+i be the other key (as described above). Then, the output decryption table for wire w m−n+i is given by:
This completes the description of the construction of the fake garbled circuitGC. Notice that by the above construction of the circuit, the output keys (or garbled values) obtained by P 2 for any set of input keys (or garbled values), equals k m−n+1 , . . . , k m . Furthermore, by the above construction of the output tables, these keys k m−n+1 , . . . , k m decrypt to z = z 1 , . . . , z n = z exactly. Thus, property (1) of the lemma trivially holds.
The proof of property (2) follows from a hybrid argument in which the gate construction is changed one at a time from the real construction to the above fake one (indistinguishability follows from the indistinguishability of encryptions). The construction and proof of this hybrid are described in full in [22] .
We are now ready to begin with the formal proof of Lemma 7. We denote the number of input wires of P 2 as n (P 2 had originally n input wires, but in Step 0 of the protocol they are expanded to n = ns wires, to prevent an attack by P 1 ). Let A 2 be an adversary controlling P 2 . We construct a simulator B 2 as follows: (and so GC i will be a check-circuit), simulator B 2 constructs circuit GC i correctly (exactly as described in Step 1 of Protocol 2). Otherwise, if ρ i = 0 (and so GC i will be an evaluation circuit), it constructs circuit GC i = GC as described in Claim 8. That is, it constructs a garbled circuit whose output is always z, regardless of the inputs used. The above constructions use the garbled values chosen for the input wires above. That is, the garbled values from v 0 i and v 1 i are used to define the input values for the ith wire in all of the s circuits (the jth value in v b i defines the value in the jth circuit). B 2 constructs the commitments and commitment sets as follows.
• First, for every r such that ρ r = 1 (and so GC r will be a check-circuit), the commitment pairs (com(k 0 i,r ), com(k 1 i,r )) that correspond to P 2 's input wires in circuit GC r are computed correctly (note that k b i,r is the r th value in v b i and com(k b i,r ) is taken from c b i ).
• In contrast, for every j for which ρ r = 0 (and so GC r will be an evaluationcircuit), these commitment pairs are computed as follows. Assume that P 2 's ith input bit is associated with wire i. Then, B 2 sets k ,r ) ).
• Second, B 2 chooses a random string ρ ∈ R {0, 1} s and constructs the commitment-sets W i, j and W i, j (of P 1 's inputs), as follows. For every input wire i and for every j such that ρ j = 0 (i.e., such that the sets W i, j and W i, j are evaluation-sets), B 2 generates the commitment-set W i, j so that the first commitment is com(0) and the rest are "correct" (i.e., as instructed in the protocol). It then computes W i, j incorrectly, committing to the exact same values as W i, j (we stress that the commitments are computed using fresh randomness, but they are commitments to the same values).
• Finally, B 2 constructs the commitment-sets for the values of j such that ρ j = 1 (i.e., such that W i, j and W i, j are check-sets). Recall that the commitment-set W i, j is made up of an initial indicator commitment (to 0 or 1) followed by s commitments, where the r th commitment corresponds to the r th circuit; denote the r th commitment in W i, j by W r i, j . Now, for every input wire i and every j such that ρ j = 1:
• For every r such that ρ r = 1 (corresponding to a check-circuit), simulator B 2 places the correct commitments in W r i, j and W r i, j .
• For every r such that ρ r = 0 (corresponding to an evaluation-circuit), simulator B 2 places commitments to zeros. (These commitments are never opened; see Figs. 3 and 4.) B 2 internally hands A 2 the garbled circuits and commitments that it constructed. (Note that the commitments corresponding to P 1 and P 2 's input wires in all of the evaluation circuits contain only a single garbled value from the pair associated with the wire. This will be important later on.)
5. B 2 simulates the coin-tossing ("prepare challenge strings") phase with A 2 so that the outcome of ρ 1 ⊕ ρ 2 equals the string ρ that it chose above. If it fails, its outputs fail and halts. Likewise, the coin-tossing phase for the second challenge string is also simulated so that the outcome is ρ as chosen above. Again, if it fails, it outputs fail and halts. We describe how this is achieved below. 6. B 2 opens the commitments for check-circuits and check-sets for A 2 , exactly as described in Step 5 of Protocol 2. 7. B 2 internally hands A 2 decommitments for the garbled values for each of the input wires corresponding to P 1 's input, in each of the evaluation-circuits. In order to do this, B 2 just chooses randomly between W i, j and W i, j for each evaluation-set, and decommits to the garbled values that are associated with the evaluation-circuits. 8. B 2 outputs whatever A 2 outputs and halts.
If at any time during the simulation, A 2 aborts (either explicitly or by sending an invalid message that would cause the honest A 1 to abort), B 2 halts immediately and outputs whatever A 2 does.
Analysis. We now show that the view of A 2 in the above simulation by B 2 is computationally indistinguishable from its view in a real execution with A 1 . We note that since only A 2 receives output in this protocol, it suffices to consider the view of A 2 only.
Before demonstrating this, we show that the coin-tossing phases can be simulated so that B 2 outputs fail with at most negligible probability. Intuitively, the simulation of this phase (for ρ) is carried out as follows: Step 5 of the simulation again.
Unfortunately, as was shown by [11] , the above simulation strategy does not necessarily run in expected polynomial-time. Rather, it is necessary to first estimate the probability that A 2 decommits when it receives a commitmentĉ to a random valueρ. Then, the number of rewinding attempts, when A 2 is given a commitment to ρ 1 = ρ ⊕ ρ 2 , is truncated as some function of the estimate. In [11] , it is shown that this strategy yields an expected polynomial-time simulation that fails with only negligible probability (including the probability of outputting ambiguous). Furthermore, the simulation has the property that the view of A 2 is computationally indistinguishable from its view in a real execution. The analysis here is exactly the same as that of [11] and is therefore not repeated. (Note that in the zero-knowledge protocol of [11] the verifier first sends a perfectly hiding commitment, the prover then sends perfectly binding commitments, and finally the parties decommit. Thus, the flow and structure of our protocol is identical to theirs.) Of course, the same strategy exactly is used for the simulation of the coin-tossing phase for ρ . We now continue with the analysis of the simulation. Intuitively, given that the above coin-tossing simulation succeeds, it follows that all of the check-circuits are correctly constructed, as in the protocol (because B 2 constructs all the circuits for which ρ i = 1 correctly). Thus, the view of A 2 with respect to these circuits is the same as in a real execution with an honest A 1 . Furthermore, the commitments for the evaluation circuits reveal only a single garbled value for each input wire. Thus, Claim 8 can be applied.
Formally, we prove indistinguishability in the following way. First, we modify B 2 into B 2 who works in exactly the same way as B 2 except for how it generates the circuits. Specifically, B 2 is given the honest B 1 's input value x and constructs all of the circuits correctly. However, it only uses the garbled values corresponding to x in the commitment-sets. That is, if the value k i, is used in all of the commitment sets W i, j and W i, j with respect to circuit , then k i, is the garbled value associated with x i (i.e., the ith bit of x) in circuit (the other garbled value associated with the wire is associated with 1 − x i ). Everything else remains the same. In order to see that A 2 's view in an execution with B 2 is indistinguishable from its view in an execution with B 2 , we apply Claim 8. In order to apply this claim, recall first that the evaluation-circuits with B 2 are all constructed according to GC, yielding output z = f (x, y) where y is the input obtained from A 2 and x is the honest party's input. In contrast, the evaluation-circuits with B 2 are all correctly constructed. Note also that the input y obtained by B 2 from A 2 is the same value as that obtained by B 2 , that defines z = f (x, y). 6 Finally, note that B 2 sends A 2 the garbled values that correspond to B 1 's input x. Thus, by Claim 8, A 2 's view with B 2 is indistinguishable from its view with B 2 . (The full reduction here works by an adversary obtaining the garbled circuits and values, and then running the simulation of B 2 or B 2 . Specifically, it generates all the check-circuits correctly and uses the garbled values it obtained to generate the evaluation-sets and the commitments in the evaluation-sets. However, it does not generate the evaluation-circuits itself, but uses the ones that it receives. If it receives real circuits then it will obtain the distribution of B 2 , and if it receives fake garbled circuits then it will obtain the distribution of B 2 . We therefore conclude by Claim 8 that these distributions are indistinguishable. We note that the full proof of this also requires a hybrid argument over the many evaluation circuits, versus the single circuit referred to in Claim 8.)
Next, we construct a simulator B 2 that works in the same way as B 2 except that it generates all of the commitments correctly (i.e., as in the protocol specification). Notice that this only affects commitments that are never opened. Note also that B 2 is given x and so it can do this. The indistinguishability between B 2 and B 2 follows from the hiding property of the commitment scheme com. (The full reduction is straightforward and is therefore omitted.)
Finally, notice that the distribution generated by B 2 is the same as the one generated by an honest A 1 , except for the simulation of the coin-tossing phases. Since, as we have mentioned, the view of A 2 in the simulation of the coin-tossing is indistinguishable from its view of a real execution, we conclude that the view of A 2 in the simulation by B 2 is indistinguishable from its view in a real execution with A 1 . Combining the above steps, we conclude that A 2 's view in the simulation with B 2 is indistinguishable from its view in a real execution with A 1 . This completes the proof of Lemma 7 and thus the case that P 2 is corrupted.
Combining the cases. The proof of Theorem 3 is completed by combining Lemmas 6 and 7.
Efficiency of the Protocol
We discuss below the efficient implementation of the different building blocks of the protocol (namely, encryption, commitment schemes, and oblivious transfer). The over- 6 Notice that there is one oblivious transfer for each input bit. Furthermore, the input of A 1 into these executions is a pair of vectors of s garbled values so that in the ith execution, the first vector contains all of the decommitments for garbled values that correspond to 0 for the ith input wire of P 2 , and the second vector contains all of the decommitments for garbled values that correspond to 1 for the ith input wire of P 2 . This means that in every circuit, A 2 receives garbled values that correspond to the same input y.
head of the protocol depends on a statistical security parameter s. The security proof shows that the adversary's cheating probability is exponentially small in s. We note that in this paper we preferred to present a full and clear proof, rather than overly optimize the construction at the cost of complicating the proof.
The computation overhead is dominated by the oblivious transfers, as all other primitives are implemented using symmetric operations. In Protocol 2 each input bit of P 2 is replaced by s new input bits, and therefore O(ns) OTs are required. In Sect. 5.2 we show how to use only O(max(n, s) ) new input bits, and consequently the number of OTs is reduced to O(max(n, s) ) (namely O(1) OTs per input bit, assuming n = (s)).
The communication overhead of the protocol is dominated by sending s copies of the garbled circuit, and 2s(s + 1) commitments for each of the n inputs of P 1 . In the protocol, the original circuit C 0 is modified by replacing each of the n original input bits of P 2 with the exclusive-or of s of the new input bits, and therefore the size of the evaluated circuit C is |C| = |C 
. Efficient Implementation of the Different Primitives
In this section, we describe efficient implementations of the different building blocks of the protocol.
Encryption scheme. Following [22] , the construction uses a symmetric key encryption scheme that has indistinguishable encryptions for multiple messages and an elusive efficiently verifiable range. Informally, this means (1) that for any two (known) messages x and y, no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between the encryptions of x and y, and (2) that there is a negligible probability that an encryption under one key falls into the range of encryptions under another key, and given a key k it is easy to verify whether a certain ciphertext is in the range of encryptions with k. See [22] for a detailed discussion of these properties, and for examples of easy implementations satisfying them. For example, the encryption scheme could be E k (m) = r, f k (r ) ⊕ m0 n , where f k is a pseudo-random function keyed by k whose output is |m| + n bits long, and r is a randomly chosen value.
Commitment schemes. The protocol uses both unconditionally hiding and unconditionally binding commitments. Our goal should be, of course, to use the most efficient implementations of these primitives, and we therefore concentrate on schemes with O(1) communication rounds (all commitment schemes we describe here have only two rounds). Efficient unconditionally hiding commitment schemes can be based on number theoretic assumptions, and use O(1) exponentiations (see, e.g., [14, 28] ). The most efficient implementation is probably the one due to Damgård, Pedersen, and Pfitzmann, which uses a collision-free hashing function and no other cryptographic primitive [7] , see also [15] . Efficient unconditionally binding commitments can be constructed using the scheme of Naor [26] , which has two rounds and is based on using a pseudo-random generator.
Oblivious transfer. The protocol needs to use an OT protocol which is secure according to the real/ideal model simulation definition. Candidate protocols can be the protocol of [8] compiled according to the GMW paradigm, or the two-round protocols of [2, 17, 27] with additional proofs of knowledge. Protocols of this latter type have been shown in [21] .
Reducing the Number of Oblivious Transfers
Protocol 2 uses a construction which replaces each input bit of P 2 with s new input bits, providing P 2 with multiple options for encoding each of its inputs. This limits the information that P 1 can gain from corrupting OT inputs (and in particular, P 2 aborts with almost the same probability irrespective of its actual input). The construction increases the number of input wires of P 2 from n to ns. We describe here a probabilistic construction which reduces the number of input wires of P 2 to max(4n, 8s) (we also show how to use codes to construct an explicit construction with similar performance). The construction has a direct effect on the overhead of the protocol, since the number of OTs is equal to the number of input wires of P 2 . The bottom line is that the number of OTs can be reduced to be in the order as the length of P 2 's input and the security parameter. We denote the original input bits as w 1 , . . . , w n and the new input bits as w 1 , . . . , w m . Our goal is to minimize m. Each w i is defined as the exclusive-or of a subset of the new input bits. We define the indicator vector z i as an m-bit binary string whose jth bit is 1 iff w j is in the subset of new input bits whose exclusive-or is w i . The construction described in Protocol 2 corresponds to indicator vectors z i = (0 . . . 0
). We describe here Protocol 3 which works with any set of indicator vectors z.
Protocol 3. (Protocol with a reduced number of input bits):
• Input, auxiliary input and specified output: These are as in Protocol 
The rest of the protocol is as in Protocol 2. P 2 chooses random values for the bits w 1 , . . . , w m , subject to the constraint that the exclusive-or of any set of new bits corresponding to an original bit w i is equal the original value of w i . P 2 then runs an OT for each of its new input bits. If one of the answers it receives in these OTs is corrupt, it aborts the protocol. Our goal is to make sure that the decision to abort does not reveal information about P 2 's original input (since this is the only place that it is used in the proof). It is clear that if teh Hamming weight of each z i is at least 2, and P 1 corrupts the inputs of a single OT, then, since each input bit of P 2 is the exclusive-or of several new bits, the decision to abort does not reveal information about any specific input bit of P 2 . This observation must be generalized for the case of P 1 corrupting more OT inputs, and hold with respect to any subset of P 2 's inputs.
Warmup-reusing bits. In order to use less "new" than ns input bits, P 2 must reuse these bits. Assume that P 2 has two input wires w 1 , w 2 and that we replace them with s + 1 new wires, w 1 , . . . , w s+1 . The input values are defined as w 1 = w 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w s , and w 2 = w 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w s+1 (namely z 1 = 11 · · · 10 and z 2 = 01 · · · 11). In this case, as is shown in Sect. 3.2, any strategy used by a malicious P 1 to corrupt OT values gives it an advantage of at most 2 −s+1 in identifying a single bit of P 2 's original input (e.g., if P 1 corrupts the '1' inputs of w 1 , . . . , w s , then if w 1 = 1 P 2 always aborts, whereas if w 1 = 0 there is a probability of 2 −s+1 that P 2 does not abort). However, w 1 ⊕ w 2 = w 1 ⊕ w s+1 (namely, z 1 ⊕ z 2 = 10 · · · 01) and therefore if P 1 corrupts the OT values of both w 1 and w s+1 it can obtain a non-negligible advantage in learning w 1 ⊕ w 2 . (For example, P 1 can corrupt the '1' inputs of w 1 and w s+1 . If P 2 does not abort P 1 can conclude that w 1 = w s+1 = 0 and therefore w 1 ⊕ w 2 = 0.)
The attack presented above can be prevented if the exclusive-or of any subset of P 2 's original bits contains at least s new input bits. Namely, if, in the general case, for every non-empty subset L ⊆ {1, . . . , n} it holds that the Hamming weight of ⊕ i∈L z i is at least s. The two lemmata stated below show that this requirement is sufficient to prove that, up to a negligible probability, P 2 's decision to abort is independent of its input values. Consider any stringb = b 1 . . . b , and assume that Pb = 2 − + ε for some ε between −1/2 and 1/2. Take any stringb whose Hamming difference fromb is 1. Consider for example the string which differs fromb in its last bit. Then Pb + Pb = P b 1 ...b −1 , and is equal, by the induction step, to 2 − +1 . Therefore Pb = 2 − − ε. By the same argument, this is also the probability of any other string whose Hamming difference fromb is 1. Now consider any stringb whose Hamming difference fromb is 2. There must be a stringb whose Hamming difference from bothb andb is 1. We know that Pb = 2 − − ε, and therefore, by applying the above argument to the relation between b andb , we get that Pb = 2 − + ε. Continuing to apply this argument we get for any stringc, that Pc = 2 − − ε if the Hamming difference betweenc andb is odd, and that Pc = 2 − + ε if the Hamming difference is even. It remains to show that ε = 0. Now, the value w 1 ⊕ w 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w is equal to the exclusive-or of at least s new input wires, and is therefore uniformly distributed when the value of less than s of these wires is fixed. On the other hand, the probability that this value is equal to b 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ b is d(b,c) is even Pc = 2 −1 (2 − + ε) (where d(α, β) denotes the Hamming difference between strings α and β). The probability that the value of exclusive-or is equal to 1 ⊕ b 1 ⊕· · ·⊕b is d(b,c) is odd Pc = 2 −1 (2 − − ε). Therefore it must hold that ε = 0, or otherwise we get a contradiction.
Recall that a corrupt OT value is one that P 2 receives in the circuit opening that is different to its corresponding value that it received in the oblivious transfers.
Lemma 10.
Suppose that for all sets L = {i 1 , . . . , i |L| } the Hamming weight of z i 1 ⊕ · · ·⊕z i |L| is at least s. Then, for any two different inputs y and y of P 2 for the function f , the difference between the probability that P 2 aborts the protocol as a result of corrupt OT values when its input is y and when its input is y is at most 2 −s+1 .
Proof. If P 1 corrupts both its inputs to an OT instance then P 2 aborts with probability 1, and the lemma holds. We therefore assume that P 1 corrupts at most one of its pair of inputs any OT instance.
Assume that P 1 corrupts s − 1 or less OT instances. We know that P 2 chooses its new input values independently of P 1 's actions. We can assume that P 2 first chooses its input values for the new wires (OTs) which P 1 corrupts (and it chooses these values uniformly at random, as was argued above). P 2 then chooses its inputs to the other new wires. The probability of P 2 aborting depends only on its first step, whereas Lemma 9 shows that this step does not fix any of P 2 's original inputs. The probability of abort is therefore independent of P 2 's original input.
Assume now that P 1 corrupts s or more OT instances, and consider the first s − 1 of these OTs. Lemma 9 implies that P 2 's input values in these OTs are independent of its original input (since the original input values are not defined after fixing these s − 1 values). Therefore, the distribution of P 2 's inputs in these OTs, even given P 2 's original input, is uniformly random, and consequently P 2 aborts with probability of at least 1 − 2 −(s−1) regardless of its input. It therefore holds, for any two input values y and y , that 2 −(s−1) is an upper bound for the difference between the probability that P 2 aborts the protocol (as a result of corrupt OT values) when its input is y and when its input is y . We describe below an efficient randomized construction which achieves the desired property of the vectors z i . As was pointed to us by David Woodruff, an explicit construction can be achieved using any explicit linear code from {0, 1} s to {0, 1} O(s) , for which any two codewords have a distance of at least (s) (Justesen codes are an example of such a code).
The randomized construction. We define 4n new input bits for P 2 . Assume, without loss of generality, that n > 2s. (Otherwise add dummy input bits. Therefore the exact number of new input bits is max (4n, 8s) .) The mapping between the n old input bits and the 4n new input bits is chosen randomly in the following way: each original input bit w i is defined to be equal to the exclusive-or of a uniformly chosen subset of the new input bits (in other words, z i is a uniformly distributed string of 4n bits).
We examine the probability that there is a subset L ⊆ {0, 1} n for which the Hamming weight of ⊕ i∈L z i is less than s: Consider any subset L, then ⊕ i∈L z i is a uniformly distributed string with 4n > 8s bits, with an expected Hamming weight of 2n. Let X j be a random variable which is set to 1 if the jth bit in this string is 1. Note that s/4n < 1/8 by our assumption that n > 2s. We therefore have:
Applying the Chernoff bound, we have that There are a total of 2 n subsets of the original input bits, and therefore the probability that any of them is equal to the exclusive-or of less than s new input bits is bounded by 2 n 2e −9n/8 ≈ 2 (1−9/8 log(e))n ≈ 2 −0.6n < 2 −1.2s . Lemma 10 therefore implies that with probability 1 − 2 −1.2s the construction suffices for our proof of security.
Choosing the strings z i . In order to use the above construction, the parties must construct a circuit that has 4n new input bits for P 2 . Furthermore, the parties must define n random strings z i of length 4n and then have the circuit map P 2 's ith input bit according to the string z i (as described above). This can be done in two ways. One possibility is to choose the mapping once and for all and hardwire it into the protocol specification. This is problematic because then there is a negligible probability that the protocol is not secure (in any execution). Thus, the mapping should instead be chosen as part of the protocol execution (because negligible failure in any execution is allowed). Fortunately, P 2 can singlehandedly choose the strings z 1 , . . . , z n in the first step of the protocol and send them to P 1 . The reason why this is fine is because this entire issue only arises in the proof of the case that P 1 is corrupted (indeed, for the case of a corrupted P 2 there is no need to split P 2 's input bits at all).
non-⊥ value that is obtained. (Notice that if only a single non-⊥ value is obtained, then this will be k g(α,β) 3 because it is encrypted under the given keys k α 1 and k β 2 . Later we will show that except with negligible probability, only one non-⊥ value is indeed obtained.) We are now ready to show how to construct the entire garbled circuit. Let m be the number of wires in the circuit C, and let w 1 , . . . , w m be labels of these wires. These labels are all chosen uniquely with the following exception: if w i and w j are both output wires from the same gate g, then w i = w j (this occurs if the fan-out of g is greater than one). Likewise, if an input bit enters more than one gate, then all circuit-input wires associated with this bit will have the same label. Next, for every label w i , choose two independent keys k 0 i , k 1 i ← G(1 n ); we stress that all of these keys are chosen independently of the others. Now, given these keys, the four garbled values of each gate are computed as described above and the results are permuted randomly. Finally, the output or decryption tables of the garbled circuit are computed. (g(α, β))) for every α, β ∈ {0, 1}.)
The entire garbled circuit of C, denoted GC, consists of the garbled table for each gate and the output tables. We note that the structure of C is given, and the garbled version of C is simply defined by specifying the output tables and the garbled table that belongs to each gate. This completes the description of the garbled circuit.
Let x = x 1 · · · x n and y = y 1 · · · y n be two n-bit inputs for C. Furthermore, let w 1 , . . . , w n be the input labels corresponding to x, and let w n+1 , . . . , w 2n be the input labels corresponding to y. It is shown in [22] that given the garbled circuit GC and the strings k 
